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CHEAP SMOKES: STATE AND
FEDERAL RESPONSES TO TOBACCO
TAX EVASION OVER THE INTERNET
Christopher Banthint
Cigarette smoking is the single most preventable cause of death in
the United States, killing 440,000 Americans every year.' That is
more deaths than those caused by alcohol, AIDS, car crashes, illegal
drugs, murders, and suicides combined.2 Millions more suffer adverse
health effects from smoking and exposure to secondhand smoke. 3
Few can doubt that a product responsible for so much death and dis-
ease has a profound impact on the public's health.
As anyone with an unfiltered email address knows, cigarettes are
on the Internet. In 1997, an informal survey by the Center for Media
and Education identified thirteen Internet cigarette vendors.4 Three
years later, Ribisl and colleagues undertook the first comprehensive
survey of the number and nature of domestic Internet cigarette ven-
dors and identified eighty-eight vendors operating through numerous
t Christopher Banthin is a Senior Staff Attorney at the Tobacco Control
Resource Center, Northeastern University School of Law. The author thanks Profes-
sor Wendy Parmet and Professor Richard Daynard for their insightful reviews of
earlier drafts and Staff Attorney Lissy Friedman for her invaluable assistance. Re-
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Research Program of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Annual Smoking-Attributable
Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs - United States, 1995-
1999, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 297, 300 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5114.pdf.
2 Eric Lindblom, Toll of Tobacco in the United States ofAmerica, Cam-
paign for Tobacco-Free Kids, at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0072.pdf (updated Nov. 13,
2003).
3 See, e.g., Christopher Banthin & Graham Kelder, Reducing Medicaid
Costs: the Economic and Health Successes of Medicaid Comprehensive Coverage of
Tobacco Cessation (The Massachusetts Coalition for a Healthy Future), available at
http://www.tobaccofreemass.org/docs/Medicaid%20Mini-
Blueprint%2OFinal%2ODraft.pdf (Oct. 15, 2003).
4 See CTR. FOR MEDIA EDUC., ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO ON THE WEB: NEW
THREATS TO YouTH (1997), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/reports/grr/032436s.htm#int top (last updated May 2001)
(funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation).
web sites.5 A follow-up study conducted in January 2002 using the
same methodology located 195 vendors,6 a remarkable increase in
light of the intervening economic recession in the United States led by
the crash in online retailing.
Internet cigarette vendors represent a growing threat to the to-
bacco control effort, particularly with regard to tax policy. Internet
cigarette vendors typically fail to charge state sales and excise taxes,7
which customers are otherwise required to pay when purchasing ciga-
rettes from a vending machine, convenience or grocery store, or other
traditional vendor. The price differences are substantial. For exam-
ple, by purchasing their cigarettes on the Internet, smokers in New
York City save up to $30 per carton (excluding shipping costs). 8
This article discusses the need for state and federal action if the
tax policy advances in the tobacco control effort are to be preserved in
light of the sale of untaxed or partially taxed cigarettes over the Inter-
net. Part I discusses the impact of Internet cigarette vendors on public
health. Part II reviews possible state approaches and justifies the im-
portance of even labor-intensive efforts for collecting tobacco taxes
on Internet sales. Part III examines advantages that proposed federal
legislation provides for the collection of state tobacco taxes. Finally,
the article concludes that increases in tobacco taxes continue to repre-
sent an important part of tobacco control in the Internet age, despite
tobacco industry arguments to the contrary. 9
I. RAMIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY
One way to predict the impact of cigarette sales over the Internet
is to ask whether they might undermine one or more of the primary
5 See Kurt M. Ribisl et al., Web Sites Selling Cigarettes: How Many Are
There in the USA and What Are Their Sales Practices?, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 352,
355 (2001) (employing keywords and popular Internet search engines to find and
examine on-line cigarette vendors).
6 Kurt M. Ribisl, The Potential of the Internet as a Medium to Encourage
and Discourage Youth Tobacco Use, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL i48, i49 (Supp. 2003).
7 See id. at i49-i50 (describing the sales practices of Internet tobacco ven-
dors that take advantage of tax loopholes).
8 The combined state and city taxes on cigarettes for New York City is $3
per pack, making the total savings for a carton of 10 cigarette packages $30. See
Matthew C. Farrelly et al., RTI International, State Cigarette Excise Taxes: Implica-
tions for Revenue and Tax Evasion 2 (May 2003), at
http://www.rti.org/pubs/8742_ExciseTaxesFR_5-03.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
9 See Hope Yen, Ex-Surgeons General Seek New Cigarette Tax, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 4, 2004, at A2 (recounting a Philip Morris spokesperson's comment that
an increase in tobacco taxes could encourage tax evasion via Internet sales).
strategies used to achieve tobacco control goals. The tobacco control
effort coalesces around a few policies, such as clean indoor air laws
and litigation, 10 but the effort's policy of increasing tobacco taxes to
dissuade smoking is the focus of concern in dealing with Internet
cigarette vendors. Most Internet cigarette vendors market huge sav-
ings compared to prices at brick and mortar vendors," the type of
savings that could only come from evading part or all of the applica-
ble tobacco taxes. Indeed, the advertisement of tax-free cigarettes is
the primary promotional tool used by Internet vendors.' 2 Many of the
smokers who turn to the Internet do so because of these promised sav-
ings.' 3 Thus, a primary question arises as to how Internet cigarette
vendors might undermine efforts to increase tobacco taxes.
Those opposed to tobacco taxes might exaggerate the threat of
Internet cigarette vendors in hopes of forestalling tobacco tax in-
creases or even cutting taxes. The argument runs as follows: tobacco
tax increases cause smokers and potential smokers to purchase ciga-
rettes over the Internet where they are very cheap. According to the
argument, the flight toward online purchasing will reduce state tax
revenues (ostensibly because states cannot collect taxes on such sales)
and take business away from local brick and mortar vendors, hurting
small business and further lowering tobacco tax revenue.
History informs us that the success of similar arguments made in
the analogous situation of cigarette smuggling have resulted in drastic
setbacks for tobacco control. Smuggled cigarettes include foreign
cigarettes being brought into a country without paying any of the
taxes 14 or related expenses in that country. 5 Another form of smug-
10 See generally Dileep G. Bal et al., The California Tobacco Control Pro-
gram, in TOBACCO AND HEALTH 341-45 (Karen Slama ed., 1995) (noting the role of
legislation regarding public smoking bans and media campaigns in promulgating an
anti-smoking message in California).
11 See Ribisl, supra note 6, at i49-i50 (explaining that some Internet vendors
claim to avoid paying state excise taxes on cigarettes).
12 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-743, INTERNET
CIGARETTE SALES: GIVING ATF INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY MAY IMPROVE REPORTING
AND ENFORCEMENT 4 (2002) (noting that these websites usually indicate that the
vendors do not comply with the Jenkins Act requirement of reporting interstate ciga-
rette sales and shipments).
13 See, e.g., Joanna E. Cohen et al., Tobacco Commerce on the Internet: A
Threat to Comprehensive Tobacco Control, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 364, 364 (2001)
(explaining how on-line vendors can thwart tobacco control initiatives by providing
avenues for cheaper cigarettes).
14 E.g. Michelle Leverett et al., Tobacco Use: The Impact of Prices, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 88, 92 (Supp. 2002).
15 Examples of related expenses are payments made under the Master Set-
tlement Agreement between the States' Attorneys General and major U.S. tobacco
companies. See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF Arr'ys GEN., TOBACCO MASTER
gling involves rerouting cigarettes manufactured for export back into
the domestic market, thereby avoiding domestic taxes and other ex-
penses. 16 The tobacco industry uses the threat of these activities to
oppose tobacco tax increases, arguing that tax increases cause more
smuggling, which in turn leads to more criminal activity, less tax
revenues, and more untaxed cigarettes.17
The industry argument worked in Canada with devastating effects
for Canada's public health. In an initiative to combat some of the
highest smoking rates in the world, Canada started raising cigarette
taxes in the 1980s. 18 The tax increases returned the desired effects.'
9
Smoking rates dropped among teens from 43% in 1981 to 23% in
1991.20 Revenue from tobacco taxes also increased during this pe-
riod.21
The tax increases, however, also triggered an increase in smug-
gling, which the tobacco industry used to its advantage.22 The tobacco
industry launched a public relations campaign designed to reduce to-
bacco taxes as a means for ending smuggling.23 In early 1994, the
federal government and several provincial governments bought into
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 45-47 (1998), at
http://www.naag.org/upload/1032468605_cigmsa.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2004)
(outlining payments to be made in settlement of state lawsuits).
See Leverett, supra note 14, at 92 (referring to this phenomenon as "gray
market smuggling").
17 See, e.g., Luk Joossens & Martin Raw, Cigarette Smuggling in Europe:
Who Really Benefits?, 7 TOBACCO CONTROL 66, 66-68 (1998) (explaining the indus-
try's argument that higher taxes on cigarettes result in increased cigarette smuggling);
see also Yi-Wen Tsai et al., The Behaviour of Purchasing Smuggled Cigarettes in
Taiwan, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 28, 28-29 (2003) (explaining tobacco companies'
assertion that raising cigarette taxes leads to increased consumption of lower-priced,
illegally obtained cigarettes).
18 CANADIAN CANCER SOC'Y, SURVEYING THE DAMAGE: CuT-RATE TOBACCO





22 See id. at 25-29.
23 See id. Ironically, some cigarette manufacturers were later connected with
the smuggling that occurred during this period. See Att'y Gen. of Can. v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (connecting
R.J. Reynolds to smuggling activity, but dismissing case based on revenue
rule barring actions to collect tax revenue of another country); see also Euro-
pean Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding
dismissal of plaintiff's allegations of a money laundering conspiracy in connection
with cigarette smuggling throughout Europe and beyond, based on foreign tax reve-
nue rule).
24the campaign and cut taxes. Real cigarette prices were cut in half in
most areas.25 In Quebec, the price of cigarettes dropped from $47 to
$23 per carton.26
The result was devastating to public health. Despite the addictive
properties of nicotine, smokers exhibit an inverse relationship be-
tween consumption and cigarette prices.27 As the price of cigarettes
rises, the quantity of cigarettes demanded falls.28 On average, for
every 10% increase in the cost of a pack of cigarettes, overall smoking
rates will decrease 3-5%, and by 7% for smokers who are less than
eighteen years of age.29 So, when some provinces cut tobacco taxes
thereby making cigarettes cheaper, public health authorities were cor-
rectly concerned.
Canadian health authorities documented smoking trends following
the cuts. 30 For one year, researchers compared smoking rates in prov-
inces that cut tobacco taxes with those that maintained taxes and
found that the tax cuts encouraged smoking.3' While smoking rates in
general declined, the provinces that maintained taxes enjoyed greater
reductions of 29% to 24.9% in just over a year.32 In provinces that cut
their tobacco taxes, smoking rates declined from 31% to 28.3% over
the same time period.33 In just one year, the difference in smoking
rates between the two groups of provinces increased from 2% to
24 CANADIAN CANCER SOC'Y, supra note 18, at 28-29.
25 id.
26 Id. at 28.
27 SURGEON GEN. DAVID SATCHER, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 322-37
(2000) (discussing the evidence of the relationship between price and demand for
tobacco products) [hereinafter SURGEON GEN. SATCHER'S REPORT], available at
hhtp://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_2000/FullReport.pdf. The presence of an in-
verse relationship between smoking and the price of cigarettes, however, does not
support the argument that the continuation of smoking is a matter of free choice.
Nicotine addiction is determined by similar pharmacological and behavioral processes
to cocaine or heroin addiction. See id. at 15.
28 Id. at 322 (discussing the support behind the conclusion of an inverse
relationship between the price and demand for cigarettes).
29 See id. at 337 (extrapolating information from studies about tobacco users'
behavior and economic theory to support several predictions about tobacco consump-
tion); see also AM. MED. ASS'N, TOBACCO TAx CHALLENGE, UPDATE REPORT 2 (2003)
(noting decrease in adolescent smoking rates based on price sensitivity), available at
http://www.smokelessstates.org/downloads/TaxChallenge.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2004).
30 Vivian H. Hamilton et al., The Effect of Tobacco Tax Cuts on Cigarette
Smoking in Canada, 156 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 187, 188 (1997).
31 See id. at 157.
32 Id. at 189.
33 Id.
3.4%. 3 Even the number of cigarettes smoked each day per smoker
declined more slowly in provinces where taxes had been cut than in
those where tax rates were unchanged.35 By 1998, per capita cigarette
consumption in the high-tax provinces dropped by 24% compared to
1990, while low-tax provinces had a drop of only 8% over the same
period.36 In 1999, after tracking the impact of the tax cuts, the Cana-
dian Cancer Society and other public health organizations concluded
that the adverse effect of the tax cuts exceeded any detrimental effects
to smoking rates caused by smuggling. 37 The tax cuts slowed quit
rates among adults and increased initiation rates among new smok-
ers.38
The loss in tobacco tax revenue also far exceeded any loss in
revenue from smuggling. 39 Since the tax rollbacks, "federal tobacco-
tax revenues have been lower than in 1993-94, by an average of $575
million" each year.40 The Canadian provincial and federal treasuries
"are $4.8 billion poorer from reduced tobacco revenues" as a result of
the 1994 tax revenue cuts, not even accounting for lost sales taxes.4 1
The beneficiary of the tax cuts appears to be the tobacco industry.
Similarly urged tax cuts designed to slow or stop the growth of
Internet cigarette vendors would result in the same negative fiscal and
public health consequences in the United States. The United States
Surgeon General and the National Cancer Institute conclude tobacco
taxation is one of the most effective means of reducing smoking
rates.42 In the United States, since January 2002, twenty-nine states
and the District of Columbia have increased their excise taxes on ciga-
rettes.43 Excise taxes on cigarettes reach as high as $3 per pack in
New York City.44 Fifteen states and the District of Columbia now
34 Id.
31 Id. at 190.
36 CANADIAN CANCER SOC'Y, supra, note 18, at 43.
" See id. at 1.
38 See Hamilton et al., supra, note 30, at 190.
39 CANADIAN CANCER SOC'Y, supra, note 18, at 43-45.
40 Id. at 43.
41 Id.
42 See SURGEON GEN. SATCHER'S REPORT, supra note 27, at 337; Frank J.
Chaloupka & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, The Impact of Price on Youth Tobacco Use, in
14 SMOKING AND TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPHS: CHANGING ADOLESCENT
SMOKING PREVALENCE 193, 193-99 (Nat'l Cancer Inst. 2001) (arguing that the price
increases, such as taxes, are effective in reducing the use of tobacco).
43 See Eric Lindblom, State Cigarette Taxes & Projected Benefits from In-
creasing Them, Campaign for Tobacco- Free Kids, at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0148.pdf (June 26, 2003)
(showin~the effective date of the last cigarette tax increase by state).
Farrelly et al., supra note 8, at 2.
have a cigarette excise tax of $1 or higher.45 The reversal or freeze of
tobacco tax increases would be disastrous for public health in the
United States, particularly in light of the fact that nearly every state
has greatly reduced spending on its tobacco control program.4
Given the evidence that the impact of Internet cigarette vendors is
not sufficient to warrant tax cuts, let alone holding off on further to-
bacco tax increases, the question must be asked: what is the impact on
smoking rates of untaxed or partially taxed cigarettes being sold by
Internet vendors? Adolescents appear particularly vulnerable. They
are three times more sensitive to cigarette prices than adults.47 Even
the tobacco industry admits, through internal documents discovered in
litigation, that the effects of price, which presumably includes the cost
of taxes, are more pronounced among young people. In one of the
industry's documents, an R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Corporation's
"[florecasting [g]roup ...determined that younger adult smokers,
particularly younger adult males smokers, tend to be very price sensi-
tive." 49 Commenting on a 1981 government study, a Philip Morris
economist stated that 20-25 year olds, and particularly males 20 to 25,
are much more sensitive to price than other groups, and the effect of
price on this group works mainly on the propensity to start smoking.50
Yet, contrary to what one might expect based on their price sensi-
tivity and their familiarity with navigating the Internet, adolescents
have not patronized Internet cigarette vendors in substantial numbers
41 Id. at 5.
46 See, e.g., AM. LUNG Ass'N, STATE OF TOBACCO CONTROL: 2003 105-07
(2004) (charting individual state spending on tobacco control and prevention and
comparing with recommendations for such spending by the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention), available at http://lungaction.org/reports/appendixa03.html; see
also Cary P. Gross et al., State Expenditures for Tobacco-Control Programs and the
Tobacco Settlement, 347 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1080, 1081-82 (2002) (noting that
most states spent less funding for tobacco control programs than the CDC recom-
mended).
47 Chaloupka & Pacula, supra note 42, at 195 (discussing how price in-
creases can have a greater impact on certain segments of the population, such as ado-
lescents).
48 See Frank Chaloupka, Mike Cummings, C. Morley and J. Horan, Tax,
price and cigarette smoking: evidence from the tobacco documents and implications
for tobacco company marketing strategies, Tobacco Control, Vol. 11, Supp. 1 pp. 62-
71 (Mar. 2002) at 65-67.
49 Letter from Gregory Novak, Director, Forecasting Group, to J.W. Johnston
and H.J. Lees, Price Elasticity Among Younger Adult Smokers (Sept. 20, 1982),
available at http://www.tobaccodocuments.org/rjr/500151647-1647.html
50 Mem. from Myron Johnson, Philip Morris: Consumer Data/Research
Dept., to Harry G. Daniel, Teenage Smoking and the Federal Excise Tax on Ciga-
rettes (Sept. 17, 1981),
http://www.tobaccodocuments.org/landman/138281 .html?printable=1.
thus far. Recent surveys indicate that only two to three percent of
adolescent smokers purchase cigarettes from Internet vendors.5'
Other more traditional sources of cigarettes continue to supply adoles-
cent smokers with the vast majority of the cigarettes they consume.52
According to a Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") report in 2000,
7% of middle school-age smokers buy their cigarettes in stores, 11%
steal them from family members or stores, 3% buy from vending ma-
chines, and 47% bum cigarettes or have someone buy for them.53
Among high school-age smokers, 32% buy their cigarettes in stores,
3% steal them, 1% get cigarettes from vending machines, and 46%
bum cigarettes or have someone buy for them.54
Several reasons may explain why Internet cigarette vendors have
been unpopular thus far among adolescents. For instance, adolescents
might fear their parents or guardians will intercept home deliveries.
51 See, e.g., Jennifer B. Unger et al., Are Adolescents Attempting to Buy
Cigarettes on the Internet?, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 360, 361 (2001) (attempting to
discover the frequency and demographics of online cigarette purchases, focusing on a
sample of approximately 1700 adolescent smokers); Sara M. Abrams et al., Internet
Cigarette Purchasing Among Ninth-Grade Students in Western New York, 36
PREVENTIVE MED. 731, 731 (2003) (summarizing a study about tobacco use and
Internet purchases of cigarettes among ninth-graders); NAT'L HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
DRUG ABUSE, THE NHSDA REPORT: How YoUTHs GET CIGARETTES 2 (2002) (survey
in which kids ages 12 to 17, who admitted to smoking in the past, were asked how
they obtained cigarettes), at
http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/2k2/YouthCigs/YouthCigs.pdf.
52 Internet vendors, however, may actually supply more of the tobacco prod-
ucts consumed by children than these surveys imply. Because the minimum online
order is typically one or more cartons, "minors need to [buy] with less frequency to
obtain the same number of cigarettes as they would obtain from other commercial
sources." Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. Inc. v. Spitzer, 2001 WL 636441, at *18 n.28
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2001) (noting defendants argument that studies underestimated the
volume of cigarettes purchased by minors through direct vendors due to minimum
purchase requirements), rev 'dsub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Pataki, 320 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003). These children may be distributing cigarettes to
friends and other peers. Approximately 21% to 46% of high school students and 22%
to 47% of middle school students who smoke report they get cigarettes from members
of a peer group. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Youth Surveillance
United States 2000, 50 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 21, 21 fig.9 (Supp.
SS-4 2001) [hereinafter Youth Surveillance United States 2000] (studying use by high
school and middle school children throughout the United States by examining stu-
dents in all fifty states and the District of Columbia). Indeed, youth are particularly
sensitive to cigarette prices and sometimes sell cigarettes to peers to off-set increases
in tobacco products. See Emma Croghan et al., The Importance of Social Sources of
Cigarettes to School Students, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 67, 72 (2003) (discussing the
ways in which teenage students in the United Kingdom obtain and exchange ciga-
rettes). No published research answers whether this alternative theory is accurate.
53 See Youth Surveillance United States 2000, supra note 52, at 21 fig.9.
54 Id.
Hence, they may prefer to attempt to buy from a convenience store or
the like where their parents are unlikely to be alerted. Indeed, even in
communities where only a few vendors sell to minors, adolescents
commonly know which stores and clerks will sell to them.55 In addi-
tion, the typical minimum order requirement of most Internet cigarette
vendors of two cartons per order or higher56 and the need to use credit
cards to pay may also dissuade adolescents. 57 These intrinsic barriers
could account for why adolescent smokers have not turned to internet
cigarette vendors in significant numbers.
The potential exists that increasingly untaxed or partially taxed
cigarettes offered by Internet vendors may attract adolescents. A
2003 study published in JAMA showed that minors purchasing ciga-
rettes from intemet cigarette vendors are successful 89% of the time
when using money orders and 94% of the time when using credit
cards.58 Almost all of the packages ordered as part of the study were
55 See Joseph R. DiFranza & Mardia Coleman, Sources of Tobacco for
Youths in Communities with Strong Enforcement of Youth Access Laws, 10 TOBACCO
CONTROL 323, 327 (2001) (explaining that familiarity with the clerk helps minors
purchase cigarettes illegally).
56 See Ribisl et al., supra note 5, at 356.
57 Although requiring a credit card may discourage some adolescents, credit
cards are ineffective for age verification purposes. A warning to online vendors by
one of the largest credit card companies states:
All Visa accepting merchants have a responsibility to adhere to all federal and state
laws. As it relates to accepting Visa products, merchants must ensure they only ac-
cept our products for legal transactions. Merchants that sell age-restricted products
(such as alcohol, tobacco) must have business processes and controls in place to en-
sure all laws governing such transactions are honored. Merchants should be aware
that possession of a Visa card or submission of a Visa account information does not
signify that the cardholder is of legal [sic] to purchase age restricted products. The
issuance of Visa cards is not restricted to individuals above 18 years of age.
VISA, ACCEPT VISA: MERCHANT RESPONSIBILITY, at
http://www.usa.visa.com/business/merchants/get accountresponsibilies.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2004). Children also may turn to online payment companies, such as
PayPal.com, which allows users to deposit funds into an account and then transfer
funds to pay for online purchases. See PAYPAL, WELCOME, at http://www.paypal.com
(last visited Apr. 11, 2004). PayPal.com states on its website that Internet cigarette
vendors may use PayPal.com. PAYPAL, SHOPS: FOOD & DRINK: TOBACCO & CIGARS,
at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=-_shop-cat-ext&loc=60450 (last vis-
ited Apr. 11, 2004). A search of the online vendors using PayPal.com returns numer-
ous cigarette vendors. See id. (where a search for "Winston" in the "search shops"
box results in a display list of cigarette vendors).
58 See Kurt M. Ribisl et al., Internet Sales of Cigarettes to Minors, 290
JAMA 1356, 1357 (2003). The study recruited four adolescents to test Internet ciga-
rette vendors' compliance with state minimum age sales laws, which make it illegal to
sell cigarettes to people under the age of eighteen. The study had youth operatives
buy cigarettes using credit cards and money orders. The credit cards used in the
survey were predominately reloadable Visa cards marketed to teenagers. The youth
simply left at the front doors of the purchasers. 59 The youth recruited
for the study encountered ineffective or no age verification protocols
at all. 60 Perhaps mindful of the effect on smoking rates among ado-
lescents, 61 as well as adult smokers, and to protect the revenue streams
created by tobacco taxes, states have begun to respond.
II. STATE RESPONSES
Every state has excise taxes on cigarettes.62 The tax is imposed
on a purchaser who purchases cigarettes within the taxing state for
personal consumption.63 The purchaser is in principle ultimately li-
able for payment of the tax, but wholesalers normally collect the
money. 64 States typically require a wholesaler or other pre-retail dis-
tributor to collect the tax by adding it into the wholesale price of the
cigarettes and then remitting it to the state.65 States generally require
that a stamp be applied to each package of cigarettes to evidence
payment of the tax.66
operatives obtained the money orders at a local post office or grocery store. Only 1%
of the packages clearly indicated they contained tobacco products. Some of the com-
plimentary items included in the packages were packages of cigarettes, pens, ashtrays,
and lighters displaying the vendors' logos. One vendor sent six free cartons of ciga-
rettes several weeks after the original purchase with no explanation or requests for
payment. Id. at 1356-58.
" See id. at 1358.
60 See id. at 1357-58. Of the nine vendors (out of fifty-five total) whose
websites instructed customers to fax or mail in a copy of their photo ID, only four
refused to sell because the identification was never sent. See id Adolescents re-
ceived 5% of the deliveries and parents received 9% of the deliveries, with only one
requiring an adult's signature. See id. at 1358.
61 See, e.g., Lori Enos, Shakeout Can't Put Out Web Tobacco Sales, E-
COMMERCE TIMEs, Feb. 23, 2001 (noting that attorneys general in Michigan, Texas,
Maryland, and other states have sued internet tobacco vendors for failing to verify
purchasers' ages), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/7625.html; see also
Michigan Attorney General Granholm Announces Charges Filed for the Illegal Sale
of Tobacco Products to Minors over the Internet, PR NEWSWmRE, Sept. 20, 2000,
available at LEXIS, News & Business, News, Wire Service Stories. Out of the nu-
merous vendors caught by the Washington Attorney General, only one asked the child
operative her age. See In Re Ziggy's Tobacco & Novelty, No. 14.8 (Order of Wash.
State Liquor Control Board) (Dec. 21, 1999) in TOBACCO PRODUCTS LIABiLTY
REPORTER 2.492 (2000), available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/releases/rel-bidis_122199.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
62 See Farrelly et al., supra, note 8, at 5.
63 See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62C, § 16; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64C, § 6
(2000).
64 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64C, § 6 (2000).
65 See id.
66 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62C § 16(d) (2000).
When vendors outside of a state's borders sell products within the
state, the state may nevertheless capture revenue from the sale by im-
posing a compensating tax known as a use tax.67 A use tax is a tax on
the use, storage, or consumption of tangible personal property within
the state.68 The use tax on cigarettes equals the sales tax and tobacco
excise taxes.69
States rely upon use taxes to circumvent their constitutional "lack
[of] power to tax a sale consummated beyond [their] borders. 70 Use
taxes, however, generally face significant enforcement problems.
States are unaware of the vast majority of sales originating from out-
of-state vendors because, typically, neither the vendor nor the buyer
reports the sale.71 In addition, there are legal barriers to enforcement.
The Supreme Court limits the circumstances under which states can
require out-of-state vendors to assist in collection of use taxes.72 In
the absence of assistance from either a vendor or third party, such as a
credit card company or a common carrier,73 states in general must rely
on citizens to volunteer the information about out-of-state purchases,
no doubt a rare occurrence.74
A. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate
businesses operating in more than one state.75 As this power resides
67 PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
§ 10.8, at 617-18 (1981).
68 Id. § 10.1, at 578.
69 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64C § 6 (2000).
70 HARTMAN, supra note 67, § 10.8, at 618.
71 States can track and easily collect taxes on some out-of-states sales with-
out assistance from vendors. For example, sales to business consumers are less likely
to go unnoticed by states because businesses must file monthly or quarterly tax re-
turns and subject to relatively frequent audits by state revenue officials in comparison
to individuals. Cars sales are also easily tracked by states because the owner registers
the car with the state where he or she resides.
72 See discussion infra Part H.A.
73 See, e.g., Bruce Mohl, UPS Eyed as Source for Names: Firm May Have
Given Customer Data to State in Cigarette Tax Probe, BOSTON GLOBE, October 22,
2003, at D1 (suggesting that state revenue officials convinced UPS to turn over names
and addresses of Massachusetts customers to whom they delivered cigarettes).
74 See HARTMAN, supra note 67, § 10.8, at 618-19 (noting the administrative
difficulty of collecting use taxes from individual purchasers). Under the Streamline
Sales Tax Project, state delegates are developing an interstate compact to simplify and
modernize sales and use tax administration. STREAMLINED SALES TAX SYSTEM FOR
THE 21 ST CENTURY, at http://www.geocities.com/streamlined2000 (Nov. 12, 2002).
Participating states will have access to use tax information and receive assistance in
collection and remittance of use taxes. Id.
75 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
in the hands of federal lawmakers, the Commerce Clause also limits
the manner in which states may regulate interstate business. 76 States
may not "unjustifiably ... discriminate against or burden the interstate
flow of articles of commerce."" This limitation, known as the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, applies even in the absence of relevant fed-
eral law.78
The contemporary framework for analyzing the impact of the
Dormant Commerce Clause on state and local taxes was established
by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.79 There, the taxpayer argued
the imposition of Mississippi's gross receipts tax on his business of
transporting motor vehicles within Mississippi unconstitutionally bur-
dened interstate commerce. 80  The Court upheld the tax and in the
process articulated a four-prong test designed to determine whether
application of a use tax comports with the dormant Commerce
Clause. 81 The tests asks whether 1) the tax is applied to an activity
having a substantial nexus with the taxing state, 2) the tax is fairly
apportioned, 3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and whether 4) the tax is fairly related to the services provided
by the state.82
Numerous cases have turned on the "substantial nexus" require-
ment, including the 1992 Supreme Court case Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.83 In Quill, North Dakota attempted to require an out-of-state
mail order business to collect and remit use taxes on all of its sales
into the state.84 The plaintiff company was the sixth largest supplier
of office equipment with about $1 million in annual sales in North
Dakota, but its contacts with North Dakota were limited to catalogues,
76 See S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (ex-
plaining that the Commerce Clause has been interpreted as a "limitation on the power
of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce").
77 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994)
(declaring Oregon's surcharge on in-state disposal of waste generated in other states
facially invalid under this negative aspect of the Commerce Clause).
78 Cf id. at 98-99 (explaining the original intent of the Commerce Clause
was to ensure that the nation, and not individual states, remained the primary eco-
nomic unit and therefore retained the requisite authority to regulate commerce).
79 430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977) (denying the notion that taxes imposed on the
privilege of doing interstate business are per se unconstitutional), overruling Spector
Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
80 Id. at 275-77.
8 Id. at 279.
82 id.
83 See 504 U.S. 298, 309-13 (holding that North Dakota's taxation of Quill
Corporation violated the Commerce Clause because the corporation did not have a
substantial nexus with the state).
84 See id.
flyers, advertisements, and telephone calls. 85 The Court reaffirmed
that the dormant Commerce Clause did not allow the states to require
an out-of-state company whose only connection to the taxing jurisdic-
tion was shipping goods to customers and minimal advertising to col-
lect taxes.86
Internet vendors in general assume that Quill delineates their tax
exposure, an assumption of which they are well suited to take advan-
tage.87 Internet-based business models "allow[] organizations a wide
variety of choices as to where to locate, what employees to hire, and
how to buy and sell goods and services. 88 As long as Internet ven-
dors avoid creating a "substantial nexus" with their customers' states,
then they may sell retail goods without having to assist states in col-
lecting sales and use taxes under Quill.8 9 The business strategy accu-
rately presumes that most online purchasers will decide not to notify
the state and remit the applicable taxes or that they will simply not
think about the tax implications.9" The net effect is that Internet ven-
dors can offer cheaper products at retail.
B. The Jenkins Act
Internet cigarette vendors, however, are prohibited from taking
full advantage of this business strategy. Quill affirmed the "substan-
tial nexus" requirement, in part, on the basis that Congress was free to
establish an alternate requirement. 91 The Quill Court was attempting
to avoid upsetting the reliance of out-of-state vendors on the "substan-
tial nexus" requirement-particularly by creating a situation where
states could hold companies liable for several years of back taxes,
which they had never attempted to collect from their customers-
while leaving room for prospective-only changes by Congress.92 In
1992 when Quill was decided, such congressional action had already
85 Id. at 302 (adding that none of Quill corporation's employees worked in
North Dakota and all of the deliveries were made by mail or common carrier).
86 See id. at 301-02, 314 (upholding National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dept. of
Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967), which held that there is no substantial nexus
when a vendor's only contact with a state is through the mail).
87 See MICHAEL L. RUSTAD & CYRUS DAFTARY, E-BusINEss LEGAL
HANDBOOK § 6.07(D)(2) (2003).
88 id.
89 See id.
90 Id. at § 6.07(D)(1).
91 See 504 U.S. at 318 (stating that Congress has the power to decide when
states may require interstate mail-order retailers to collect use taxes).
92 See id. at 315-17 (noting that the bright-line rule granting tax exemption to
vendors whose only contacts with a state are through the mail has engendered reliance
of the mail-order industry and encouraged growth).
occurred with regard to out-of-state cigarette vendors via Congress'
1949 passage of the Jenkins Act.
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The Jenkins Act requires any person or business that ships ciga-
rettes to a state imposing a tax on tobacco products to disclose to state
tax officials the name and address of the shipper and the person to
whom cigarettes are shipped.94 The disclosure also must include the
brand names and quantities. 95 States are expected to use this informa-
tion to obtain use taxes from the person who is ultimately liable for
tobacco taxes, the smoker. Accordingly, while states may not require
Internet cigarette vendors to collect and remit taxes under Quill, the
Jenkins Act prohibits Internet cigarette vendors from offering their
customers anonymity with regard to use taxes that many other Internet
vendors provide.
The Jenkins Act was enacted in response to tobacco tax evasion
by mail order cigarette houses located in tobacco-growing states and
other states with very low tobacco taxes or none at all. 96 Throughout
the 1940s, state tobacco tax revenues climbed significantly for the
first time in history. 97 From 1939 to 1949, eighteen states started tax-
ing cigarettes. 98 By 1949, thirty-nine states taxed cigarettes. During
this same period, cigarette tax revenues at the state level jumped from
$56,140,000 to $381,040,000.99 The surreptitious movement of ciga-
rettes from state to state suddenly became a very lucrative business,
abetted by the astounding increase in the popularity of smoking during
the same time period.'00 The potential tax revenue loss from mail
order houses was in the millions.' 0 The Jenkins Act was intended to
stop the loss in state tax revenue caused by the evasion of state to-
bacco taxes, to protect vendors who correctly charged their customers
13 Pub. L. No. 363, 63 Stat. 884 (1949) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
375-378 (2000)).
94 15 U.S.C. § 376 (2000).
9' Id. § 376(a)(1).
96 See 81 CONG. REc. 6346, 6346-47 (1949) (explaining that the purpose of
the bill is to assist the States in collecting both sales and use taxes on cigarettes).
97 See THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, THE TAX BURDEN ON TOBACCO: HISTORICAL
COMPILATION 1992 1 (1993).
98 See id. at 7 (showing that by the end of 1939, 21 states were taxing ciga-
rettes and by 1949, 39 states were taxing cigarettes).
99 Id. at 8.
100 See RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES To ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR
CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP
MORRIS 112-40 (1996) (discussing how the World War II years saw a dramatic in-
crease in American smoking habits).
'0 See 81 CONG. REC. 6346, 6348-51 (1949) (noting loss estimates ranging
from $3 million to $50 million dollars annually from evasion of State sales taxes).
state tobacco taxes, and to halt the use of the United States mail to
evade state tobacco taxes.1
0 2
The manner in which local vendors sold cigarettes soon overshad-
owed and even diminished the problems associated with mail order
cigarettes. Before the Jenkins Act, vendors sold cigarettes in hopes of
selling other merchandise, nearly all of which had a higher markup.1
0 3
But, cigarette manufacturers knew that "if dealers ... gave adequate
display space to cigarettes, gross profits on their sale were very high
relative to the capital invested in their inventory, thanks to the prod-
uct's remarkably high turnover rate and frequent, reliable deliveries
by wholesalers .... To impress more firmly on vendors the virtues of
this dream product, Reynolds [Tobacco Company] now [in the late
1940s] systematically upgraded its field forces" with better wages,
travel allowances, long-term arrangements, training, and more.1
0 4
Similar campaigns were either in place or soon started by other manu-
facturers.' 
05
In addition to increasing cigarette sales by local vendors, cigarette
manufacturers quickly recognized another important advantage to
courting local vendors. The tobacco control movement was starting
during this time period as the damaging effects of smoking came to
light.10 6 Cigarette manufacturers needed local allies to oppose bur-
geoning tobacco control efforts. Manufacturers helped fund retail
associations for lobbying purposes and poured promotional dollars
and advertisement materials into local cigarette retailing.'0 7 As of
2001, the portion of the cigarette industry promotional budget that
goes to local retailers reached $9.5 billion, which represents approxi-
mately 85% of the industry's entire promotional budget. 0 8 As atten-
tion focused on local cigarette vendors and mail order houses, the
relevance of the Jenkins Act ebbed.
102 S. REP. No. 84-1147, at 1 (1955).
103 See KLUGER, supra note 100, at 122 (claiming that in the early stages of
selling cigarettes, vendors would use cigarettes to lure people into their stores to buy
other merchandise).
o Id. at 122, 123.
105 See id. at 127 (discussing Philip Morris's efforts to repair and stabilize
their sales by offering better pay and benefits to attract better salesmen).
106 See id. at 132-36. Led by some pioneering studies by Ernst Wynder and
Richard Doll published in the 1950s, the medical profession realized through the
emerging science of epidemiology that smoking was associated with lung cancer. Id.
at 134-36.
107 See generally Michael S. Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Lobby
Political Influence on US State Legislatures in the 1990s, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 124
(2001).
108 FED. TRADE COMM'N, CIGARETTE REPORT FOR 2001 (2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/2001 cigreport.pdf.
The Internet revived interest in mail order cigarettes and reestab-
lished the relevance of the Jenkins Act. Shipping untaxed or partially
taxed cigarettes across state borders returns to the consumer a gross
savings up to $20.50 per carton in some states.'0 9 Additionally, adver-
tising and taking orders online is much cheaper and quicker than tradi-
tional mail order sales. In 2001, it was estimated that states would be
losing up to $1.4 billion annually to Internet cigarette vendors by 2005
from uncollected states tobacco taxes. 10
As part of its August 2002 report on intemet sales of cigarettes,
the United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") contacted ten
states with the highest tobacco taxes to determine whether they had
undertaken efforts to enforce the Jenkins Act. 11' Of the nine states
who provided information, seven reported to the GAO that starting in
1997 they "had made some effort to promote Jenkins Act compliance
by Internet cigarette vendors." ' 1 2 This included contacting or sending
letters requesting compliance with the Jenkins Act from those internet
cigarette vendors suspected of selling within the states."13  These
states reported that most vendors failed to respond or responded by
stating the Jenkins Act was no longer good law. 14 Indeed, over half
of the 147 websites surveyed by the GAO indicated they do not com-
ply with the Jenkins Act. 15 When cigarette vendors turned over cus-
tomer lists to states, the customers ultimately remitted the applicable
tobacco taxes to the states.16
The states studied by the GAO also responded that they are "lim-
ited in what they can accomplish on their own to address this situation
and successfully promote Jenkins Act compliance by Internet cigarette
vendors.,' 17 The report found that "all of the officials pointed our that
their states lack the legal authority necessary to enforce the [Jenkins]
[A]ct and penalize the vendors who violate it, particularly with ven-
109 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:40A-8 (West 2004) (showing that the tax in
New Jersey is $0.1025 for each cigarette, totaling $2.05 per pack).
l"0 See Robert Rubin, Chris Charron, & Moira Dorsey, Online Tobacco Sales
Grow, States Lose, (Forrester Research, Inc.), Apr. 27, 2001, excerpts available at
http://www.forrester.com/ER/Research/Brief/Excerpt/0, 1317,12253,00.html.
' GAO, INTERNET CIGARETTE SALES: GWING ATF INVESTIGATIVE
AUTHORITY MAY IMPROVE REPORTING AND ENFORCEMENT, Report No. GAO-02-743,
2 n.3. (August 2002). Eleven states were initially contacted-the ten with the highest
excise taxes and one additional state that seemed to be promoting the Jenkins act. Of
these eleven, only nine provided information for the study. Id.
112 Id. at 3.
113 Id.
'4 Id. at 3-4.
115 Id.
116 Seeid. at ll-12.
"7 Id. at 15.
dors residing in other states."'1 18  The enforcement provision only
states "[w]hoever violates any provision of this chapter shall by guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than $1,000, or impris-
oned not more than 6 months, or both."'"19 Additionally, federal courts
have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations.12 0 The GAO re-
port indicated that no federal agency had assisted states in Jenkins Act
enforcement beyond turning over some potential violators' names to
the states. 121
Despite the states' reported feeling of powerlessness, the absence
of statutory language does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of
state enforcement. States might be able to proceed under an implied
right of action. The Supreme Court in the 1975 case Cort v. Ash
22
"attempted to harmonize and rationalize the law in this [implied right
of action] area by formulating a four-part test for determining whether
private remedies were available for violations of statutes not expressly
providing them."' 23 The test instructs courts to consider four factors:
1) "[I]s the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial bene-
fit the statute was enacted";
2) "[I]s there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one";
3) "[I]s it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legis-
lative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff'; and
4) "[I]s the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law?" 124
Although courts are moving away from the Cort factors (in favor
of relying exclusively on congressional intent),125 they have not fully
rejected them. For the implied cause of action analysis of the Jenkins
Act, the Cort factors provide an important context that would other-
118 Id. at 15.
119 15 U.S.C. § 377 (2000).
120 Id. § 378.
121 See GAO, supra note 111, at 3, 7-11 (discussing how only the ATF has
even investigated Jenkins Act violations and that the ATF has consistently failed to
prosecute offenses that they did find).
122 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
123 PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 945-46 (3d ed. 1998).
124 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
125 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (stating that
the Cort factors are just "guides" to determining the court's "focal point": congres-
sional intent).
wise be missed by simply asking whether congressional intent existed.
The Jenkins Act was passed in an era when courts commonly implied
rights of action, and before the Supreme Court announced its reluc-
tance to recognize them. 126  Legislative drafting and congressional
debate of the Jenkins Act occurred when explicit statements about
enforcement were not necessary for enforcement. Indeed, the factors
discussed in Cort provide an appropriate framework for interpreting
who may enforce the Jenkins Act.
Application of all of the Cort factors to the Jenkins Act leans in
favor of an implied right of action for state enforcement. With re-
spect to the first Cort factor, the text and the legislative history of the
Act leave little room for doubt that state tax enforcement officials fall
within this class. Indeed, states are the class. The information re-
quired to be disclosed under the Act, including the name of the ven-
dor, all of its places of business, customer lists, brands and quantities
of cigarettes shipped, are all reported solely to state officials. 12' The
vendors are not required by the Act to report this or other information
to any other individual or governmental body. 2 9 The legislative his-
tory of the Act suggests the same conclusion. During the 1949 con-
gressional committee hearings and floor debate, numerous state tax
officials testified in support of the bill or submitted written testi-
mony. 130 The central theme of their support and that of congressional
supporters was that the states needed help in collecting lost tax reve-
nue from mail order cigarette sales.'
3
'
Application of the second Cort factor also supports the finding of
implied authority for state enforcement of the Jenkins Act. Although
legislators opposed to enactment in 1949 decried the added federal
budgetary expenses needed to cover the cost of federal enforce-
ment,132 a 1953 amendment recognized that state tax officials had animplied right of action. 33 The amendment changed the reporting re-
126 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) ("In sum, it is not
only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar
with these unusually important precedents from this and other federal courts [such as
Cort v. Ash] and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with
them." Id. at 699.).
127 It should be noted that the parties in Cort were both private parties and so
the factors outlined in that case may not equally apply to a case where one of the
parties is the government.
128 15 U.S.C. § 376 (2000).
129 id.
130 For examples of oral and written testimony, see 81 CONG. REc. 6346,
6354, 6357 (1949).
131 Id. at 6348, 6360.
132 Id. at 6349, 6352, 6355, 6359.
133 Technical Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, 67 Stat. 617 (1953) (codified as
quirement so that the reports would be "filed with" state tax officials,
rather than "forward[ed] to" them. 134 The amendment had the pur-
pose of assuring, in the event of an offense committed under this Act,
that the venue of the action would be in the district in which the state
tobacco administrator is located. 135 The change makes no difference
to federal enforcement agents who can just as easily enforce the law
where the seller is located as where its customers are located. It does,
however, make a world of difference for state officials who are simply
unable to prosecute cases in other states. After the 1953 amendment,
a seller should not be able to escape prosecution by arguing improper
jurisdiction. Viewed in this context, the 1953 amendment has mean-
ing and supports the notion that Congress intended state tax officials
to have an implied cause of action.
The third Cort factor supports the presence of at least one implied
cause of action available to state tax officials, that is, enjoining sellers
from violating the Act. The Act provides for this remedy (but does
not state who enforces it). It states, "[t]he United States district courts
shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this chap-
ter., 136 States suing for this remedy would further the Act's intended
goals.
Lastly, the fourth Cort factor, which asks "is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the con-
cern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law," addresses federalism. 3 7  The
fourth seeks to limit federal law from impinging on the scope of state
law and the accountability state lawmakers have to their constituents
in this capacity. In the typical case, federalism concerns counsel
against an implied right of action. For example, a federal district
court dismissed an implied right of action under the Federal Aviation
Act to compel the defendant to cut down trees where a state common
law nuisance claim could have provided the same relief.138 An im-
plied cause of action under the Federal Aviation Act would have sup-
planted the state's authority to define policy through its common law
on nuisance.
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 376(a)(1) (2000)) (requiring that reports be "filed with" state
tax officials instead of forwarding them to state tax officials).
134 See S. REP. No. 84-1147, at 2-4 (1955).
131 See id. at 1.
136 15 U.S.C. § 378 (2000).
137 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
138 County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich Connecticut, 745 F. Supp.
951 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing the implied right of action on grounds independent
from the consideration of the nuisance claim). The Commission of Transportation of
Connecticut was also named as a defendant. Id.
In this case, federalism weighs in favor of an implied right of state
action for two reasons. First, state enforcement of the Jenkins Act
empowers the states since it would be giving them new authority.
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Second, there is no state law to displace. While the enforcement of
state tobacco excise taxes in general is relegated to state law, the dor-
mant Commerce Clause denies states the ability to compel the assis-
tance of Internet cigarette vendors. Indeed, Quill makes it clear that
the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from asserting tax ju-
risdiction over out-of-state sellers that have no presence in the state,
unless Congress legislates otherwise. 140 This is exactly what has hap-
pened under the Jenkins Act. Congress used its power under the
Commerce Clause to authorize states to collect needed information
about interstate cigarettes sales, and thus, remove possible dormant
Commerce Clause checks on such states efforts. As a result, the Jen-
kins Act does not displace state remedies. To the contrary, it evi-
dences Congress' intent to provide states with a remedy that they
could not develop on their own.
The State of Washington, which participated in the GAO report,
recently explored Jenkins Act enforcement using an implied cause of
action approach. Washington successfully forced one of the most
ubiquitous Internet cigarette vendors, www.dirtcheapcig.com, to pro-
vide customer information to tax authorities in the State. 14 1 The com-
139 Courts may be more willing to find implied causes of action by states than
private litigants in response to the so-called "new federalism," illustrated in New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The Supreme Court has a renewed no-
tion of state sovereignty, and implying causes of action for states appears to comport
with this continuing effort.
140 See supra Part II.A.
141 See State of Washington v. www.dirtcheapcig.com, Inc., 260 F.Supp. 2d.
1048, 1052 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (finding that the state had an implied right of action
against the Internet cigarette seller). Dirtcheapcig.com has been the subject of numer-
ous state enforcement efforts. In 2001, when the Massachusetts Department of Reve-
nue asked it to release a list of its customers, Dirtcheapcig.com refused and stated
"[w]e are the last refuge of the persecuted smoker." See Bruce Mohl, Cigarette
Shoppers Turn to the Internet, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2001 at Al. A year earlier,
Dirtcheapcig.com sold to minors in the compliance checks run by the Department of
Consumer Affairs of New York City a few months after the Attorney General of
Michigan brought criminal charges against it for the same conduct. See John Radzie-
jeski & Kevin Ortiz, Department of Consumer Affairs Cracks Down on Mail-order &
Internet Tobacco Dealers who Sell Cigarettes to Minors, New York City Dept. of
Consumer Affairs, Spring 2001, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dca/html/cigsminors.html (visited at Sept. 21, 2001). The
California Attorney General is currently suing dirtcheapcig.com. See Press Release,
Office of the Attorney General, State of California, Attorney General Lockyer Files
Lawsuits Against Five Retailers for Internet Sales to Minors: Companies Also Evad-
ing Reporting Requirements, Depriving State of Excise Taxes (April 1, 2003), at
http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/ 2003/03-039.htm.
pany advertised cigarette sales in Washington through the Internet and
newspapers, took orders via the phone and the internet, shipped ciga-
rettes into the state, but failed either to register with the state as a ciga-
rette vendor or to report individual cigarette sales to the state. 
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Although the case was settled before trial, the court had a chance
to rule on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, in which Dirtcheap
argued that the State of Washington had neither an explicit nor im-
plied right to sue under the Jenkins Act.14 3 The court disagreed, find-
ing that because Congress clearly intended to help states in passing
the Jenkins Act, states have an implied right to enforce the Jenkins
Act in court. 44
States have enacted laws to help carry out their implied authority
provided by the Jenkins Act. For example, in September 2002, Cali-
fornia enacted complementary legislation allowing state officials to
recover attorneys' fees in Jenkins Act enforcement cases. 45 The leg-
islation also requires Internet cigarette vendors to display a warning
on packages of cigarettes notifying the customer that he or she is re-
sponsible for unpaid state tobacco taxes and that the seller has notified
state officials about the sale. 146 The legislation leverages these and
other reporting requirements to encourage Internet cigarette vendors
to simply collect and remit taxes before the sale.
C. Banning Direct-to-Consumer Cigarette Deliveries
Tobacco taxes constitute only one aspect of state regulation of
cigarette distribution. States also license retailers, 47 specify age veri-
fication procedures and age warnings, 14 8 require minimum pricing,
14 9
prohibit self-service displays, 50 prohibit vending machines,' 5' pro-
hibit cigarette giveaways, 152 and require retailer training. 53 Rather
142 Dirtcheap, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 51-52.
141 Id. at 1050, 1053. Dirtcheap also argued that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over it because it was operated out of Kentucky. See id. at 1052.
'" See id. at 1055.
145 CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 102 1.10 (West Supp. 2002) (permitting the award
of attorney's fees for successful claims to enforce the Jenkins Act); CAL. REV. & TAX
CODE § 30101.7 (West Supp. 2003) (establishing collection of cigarette sale taxes and
penalties for violations of the Jenkins Act).
146 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 30101.7.
147 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62C, § 67 (West 2002); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 64C, §2 (West 2000).
148 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 6 (West 2000); MASS. REGS. CODE
tit. 940, §§ 21.04(2)(b); 22.06(2)(b) (2000).
"49 E.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 830, § 64C. 14.1 (2004).
150 E.g., MASS. CODE REG. tit. 940, §§ 21.04(2)(c), 22.06(2)(c) (2003).
I ld. §§ 21.04(4)(b), 22.06(4)(b).
152 Id. §§ 21.04(1)(a), 22.06(1)(a).
than trudge through the legal and practical uncertainties of achieving
regulatory parity between the internet and traditional cigarette ven-
dors, states could simply ban direct-to-consumer cigarette deliver-
ies. 1
54
On August 16, 2003, New York became the first state to ban di-
rect-to-consumer cigarette deliveries. 155 Legislators felt "the shipment
of cigarettes sold via the interet or by telephone or by mail order to
residents of [New York] pos[ed] a serious threat to public health,
safety, and welfare, to the funding of health care... and to the econ-
omy of the state."' 56 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
New York's ban. The other circuits have not yet addressed the ques-
tion. Alaska is the only other state thus far to ban direct-to-consumer
cigarette deliveries.
157
Courts typically apply a two-step analysis to determine if such
laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 158 First, courts initially
ask whether the state law is "basically an [economic] protectionist
measure, or... [whether it] fairly [can] be viewed as a law directed to
legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that
are only incidental."' 59 If elements of economic protectionism are
found, then courts strictly scrutinize the law, 60 which usually leads to
its per se invalidation. 161
Following the 1970 U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., courts apply a lesser standard of review when a
153 Id. §§ 21.04(3)(b), 22.06(3)(b).
154 Many states have adopted similar bans for Internet alcohol sales. See Eric
L. Martin, Note, A Toast to the Dignity of States: What Eleventh Amendment Juris-
prudence Portends for Direct Shipment of Wine, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1303, 1307
(2003) (noting that many states ban Internet sales of wine).
155 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-11(2002) (banning direct to consumer
delivery of cigarettes and bidis).
156 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir.
2003).
157 See ALASKA STAT. § 43-50-105 (West Supp. 2003) (banning direct to
consumer sale of cigarettes).
158 See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
9 Id. at 624. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified protectionist measures
as laws that "discriminat[e] against articles of commerce coming from outside the
State" which are no different from articles in-state except for their origin. Id. at 626-
27. There is a narrow exception to the per se rule. The U.S. Supreme Court has al-
lowed protectionist laws to stand based on the "noxious" character of an article in
commerce. See id. at 628-29. The court stated that quarantine laws that are directed
against interstate commerce, like with containing diseased livestock, were "noxious"
because its "very movement risked contagion and other evils." Id. at 629.
160 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979) (noting that the
"strictest scrutiny" shall apply to review of discriminatory state laws).
161 E.g., City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 623-24 (claiming that state legislation
which amounts to mere economic protection is per se invalid).
state law "regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental.
...62 State laws that do so "will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local benefits.' 63 The intensity of the burden that will be allowed
depends on "the nature of the local interest involved."' 64 Preservation
of public health, safety and welfare weigh strongly in favor of
states. 165
State regulation of Internet sales and communication initially
spurred renewed judicial use of another dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, the "extraterritoriality" analysis, which blocks states regula-
tion of commercial activity that takes place wholly outside of the
state.166  The extraterritoriality analysis appears well suited for the
super-geographical nature of typical websites.167 For example, a New
York law banning digitized web site content was struck down under
the dormant Commerce Clause because the law would have regulated
not only the content viewed by Internet users in New York, but also
the same content viewed by Internet users in other states.
68
162 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (rejecting a state order that imposed restrictions
on a fruit producer's interstate commerce). The Supreme Court has chosen not to
draw a clear distinction between when this test and the first Commerce Clause test
apply. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-
79 (1986) (discussing when a lesser standard of review is appropriate when evaluating
a statute under the Commerce Clause).
163 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
164 Id.
165 See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981)
(asserting that issues of local concern over health or safety are generally interpreted to
give states a higher level of commerce control).
166 See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 342-43 (1989). See gen-
erally Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 817-18 (2001) (discussing courts approaches to Internet
regulation using the dormant Commerce Clause).
167 See PSINet v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611, 626-27 (W.D. Va. 2000)
(finding that because there is no way to limit access to online materials by geographic
location, a California website owner would have to alter his commercial materials in
all states in order to comply with a Virginia law); see also ACLU v. Johnson, 194
F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding no guarantee that an Internet communica-
tion from one New Mexican intended for another New Mexican "will not travel
through other states en route"); see also Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler,
55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (finding that because the Internet lacks
geographical boundaries, "a publisher of a web page cannot limit the viewing of his
site to everyone in the country except for those in [a particular state]").
168 See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (holding that a New York statute regulating content available to minors would
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because such a statute would regulate content
viewed by citizens outside of New York state).
Recent scholarship and courts prefer the Pike balancing test,
pointing out that states' interests should be factored into their deci-
sion-making. 169 Such was the case in the Second Circuit opinion on
New York's ban. 170 The court found that New York demonstrated a
legitimate governmental interest in stopping sales of cigarettes to mi-
nors and in stopping the sale of untaxed or minimally taxed ciga-
rettes.1 71 New York convinced the court that the burden on out-of-
state sellers was not excessive in relation to these benefits. 172
The court ultimately considered Internet cigarette vendors to be a
type of distribution, as opposed to a group of competing out-of-state
vendors. 173 Such interpretation joins numerous cases upholding state
authority to regulate the cigarette distribution. 74  Given the recog-
nized authority of states in this area and the governmental interests in
reducing the adverse health effects of smoking, other federal circuits
that address this issue may well conclude that bans on direct-to-
consumer cigarette deliveries are allowed under the dormant Com-
merce Clause.
D. State Level Recommendations
Debate about the pros and cons of state taxation on interstate sales
surges with the pace of commercial activity on the Internet. One posi-
tion in this debate advocates doing away with or significantly limits
sale and use taxes on retail sales over the Internet. 175 The Internet
economy, it is thought, would grow much more quickly without the
imposition of state taxation than otherwise. 176 Under this reasoning,
even if the Internet economy displaced part of the economic produc-
169 See, e.g., State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 409 (Wash. 2001) (applying the
Pike test and considering local interests).
170 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 209
(2nd Cir. 2003) (applying the Pike test).
171 See id. at 217 (noting that this result was reached because the effects of
New York's ban on interstate commerce were de minimus).
172 Id.
173 See id. at 212-14 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)).
174 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (pro-
viding that while state bans on tobacco advertising violated the First Amendment,
state bans on these sales themselves are valid); see also Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S.
343, 361-62 (1900) (noting states may ban the manufacture and sale of cigarettes
within their boundaries).
175 See generally ALAN E. WISEMAN, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
ECONOMIC IssuEs: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERNET 71 (July 2000) (pre-
senting theoretical arguments for and against taxing electronic commercial transac-
tions), at http://www.ftc.gov/be/hilites/economicissues.pdf (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
176 See id.
tivity derived from brick and mortar economies, the benefits of the
new Internet economy would filter back down through income taxa-
tion on the entrepreneurial members of the online community.
This position draws support from the amount of work involved
with collecting sale and use taxes on interstate sales. Collection ef-
forts are labor intensive.1 77 The Internet has magnified the workload
of state revenue departments. 78 Attempts to collect the compensating
use taxes for general sales taxes have achieved modest success in
terms of revenue generated at best when compared to collection ef-
forts involving income taxes, gasoline taxes, and taxes on other
wholly in-state activities. 179 Costs associated with collection efforts
have approached and even surpassed the amount of revenue raised.
1 80
The position supporting the elimination or limitation of sales and
use taxes, however, ignores one of the most important policy ration-
ales for taxation: encouraging good behavior and discouraging bad
behavior. The taxation of tobacco products quintessentially exempli-
fies this rationale. Shortly after the United States Surgeon General
released his groundbreaking report in 1964 that linked smoking to
cancer, 181 state cigarette excise taxes increased dramatically. 82 State
and federal tax increases on tobacco products during the intervening
years reduced smoking rates and may have saved millions of lives.'83
177 See Hal R. Varian, Taxation of Electronic Commerce (April 2000) (stating,
"there is no easy way to enforce the collection of use taxes, since states do not have
tax jurisdiction over out-of-state-companies, and thus cannot require them to collect
use taxes at the point of sale."), at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/Papers/etax.html; but see discussion infra Part IV
(noting that collection of tobacco taxes from consumers can raise revenues).
178 See Varian, supra note 177; ROBERT J. CLINE & THOMAS S. NEUBIG, THE
SKY IS NOT FALLING: WHY STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES WERE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY
IMPACTED BY THE INTERNET IN 1998 1 (noting use tax collection is a longstanding
problem in the area of mail order catalogues), available at
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/document/Emst&Young 1.pdf (June 18,
1999).
179 See State and Local Taxation of Out-of-State Mail Order Sales, Advisory
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, A-105 at 2-8 (April 1986) (discussing the
difficulty of enforcement with mail orders).
'80 See id.
181 See SURGEON GENERAL LUTHER TERRY, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 155-81
(1964).
182 Farrelly et al., supra note 8, at 2.
183 Kenneth J. Meier & Michael J. Licari, The Effect of Cigarette Taxes on
Cigarette Consumption 1955 Through 1994, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1126 (1997).
The Surgeon General and the National Institute believe tobacco taxation is one of the
most effective means for reducing smoking rates. See SURGEON GEN. SATCHER'S
REPORT, supra note 27, at 337 (discussing the effective reduction in smoking antici-
Thus, debate about the efficacy of collecting excise taxes for
Internet cigarette sales should take into consideration the public health
and fiscal impact of smoking. Smoking causes approximately $157
billion in annual health-related economic losses, much of which is
paid for by state Medicaid programs. 184 For example, in Massachu-
setts, from 1991 to 1998, smoking-related asthma cost $10 million
annually. 85 Tobacco-related birthing complications cost as much as
$2 billion annually in this country. 186 Medicaid pays for well over
half of such neonatal expenses. 187 The CDC estimates that "[flor each
of the approximately 22 billion packs sold in the U.S. in 1999, $3.45
was spent on medical care attributable to smoking, and $3.73 in pro-
ductivity losses were incurred, for a total cost of $7.18 per pack.' 188
While the extra burden involved in collecting tobacco taxes on
cigarette sales over the Internet is labor intensive, the countervailing
benefits are substantial. Even if the cost of collection exceeds the
revenue raised, states will enjoy countervailing savings on smoking-
related health care expenditures. Furthermore, collecting tobacco
taxes from the consumer may do more to dissuade smoking than add-
ing in taxes at the retail level. The thought of getting special attention
from state revenue officials in the form of a Jenkins Act letter may
steer smokers back to brick and mortar vendors and discourage poten-
tial smokers from starting. Such letters might also alert parents that
their children are purchasing cigarettes.
The debate about taxation on Internet commerce is an important
and necessary one if society is to realize the full potential of the Inter-
net, but legitimizing untaxed or partially taxed cigarette sales over the
Internet or cutting tobacco taxes would reverse a long-lasting and
highly effective public health initiative. Such a reversal would cause
a public health tragedy on parallel with what Canada experienced after
cutting its tobacco taxes. Collection under the Jenkins Act or by some
other means, while labor intensive and difficult, keeps smoking rates
low and saves state revenue generated from tobacco taxes and reve-
pated in a system of tobacco taxation); Chaloupka & Liccardo Pacula, supra note 42,
at 193-99.
184 J.L. Fellows et al., Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of Po-
tential Life Lost, and Economic Costs - United States, 1995-1999, 51 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., April 12, 2002 (discussing the detrimental effects of
smoking on quality of life which generates health costs that must be absorbed by
federal programs).
8, See Banthin & Kelder, supra note 3, at 6.
186 See id. at 7.
187 See id.
188 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 1, at 302 (conclud-
ing that the costs to society justify increased funding for interventions).
nues spent on smoking related expenditures. The approach of ban-
ning all direct-to-consumer cigarette deliveries affords the same pro-
tection with easier enforcement.
Il. FEDERAL RESPONSE
Although state efforts to collect the tobacco taxes from customers
of Internet cigarette vendors are productive, 189 it is labor intensive
relative to tobacco tax collection from in-state vendors. The obvious
preference would be for Internet cigarette vendors to collect and remit
taxes before shipping cigarettes or to use a wholesaler licensed within
the state. Under Quill, such an approach to Internet cigarette vendors
would violate the Commerce Clause.
Quill makes clear that Congress could authorize states to require
out-of-state sellers to collect use taxes. Congress may act on this invi-
tation with regard to all out-of-state vendors of cigarettes, including
those on the Internet. On December 9, 2003, the Senate unanimously
passed Senate Bill 1177 entitled the "Prevent All Cigarette Traffick-
ing Act."190 Complementary legislation, House Resolution 2824, is
being debated in the House.'
9 1
In addition to clarifying that states have the authority to compel
production of Jenkins Act information from Internet cigarette vendors,
both legislative proposals would require tobacco taxes be paid before
cigarettes are shipped to customers.192 Senate Bill 1177 states:
With respect to delivery sales into a specific state and place,
each delivery seller shall comply with ... all State, local,
Tribal, and other laws generally applicable to sales of ciga-
rettes or smokeless tobacco as if such delivery sales occurred
entirely within the specific state and place, including laws im-
posing ... payment obligations or legal requirements relating
189 See discussion infra Part IV; see also discussion supra Parts I, II.C (relat-
ing to public health and public health funding benefits).
90 S. 1177, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
191 See Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act, H.R. 2824, 108th Cong. § 2
(2003) (setting out requirements for compliance with laws, recordkeeping, and report-
ing for the interstate sale or distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco); see also
150 CONG. REC. D35 (daily ed. Jan. 28. 2004) (amended and passed by Committee on
the Judiciary).
192 See S. 1177 § 2(e), 5 (b); H.R. 2824 §§ 2-5 (requiring the payment of taxes
prior to delivery as well as the filing of information on each sale of cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco with the state tobacco tax administrator, and imposing civil and
criminal penalties for violation); see also discussion supra Part lI.B.
to the sale, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes and smoke-
193less tobacco ....
This language and similar language in House Resolution 2824194
will effectively fold the Internet cigarette vendors into state regulatory
schemes for cigarette distribution. Just like traditional brick and mor-
tar cigarette vendors, under the proposed legislation internet cigarette
vendors will be forced either to collect tobacco taxes at the point of
sale or to obtain their cigarettes from wholesalers who are authorized
to affix appropriate state tax stamps to cigarette packages.
Folding Internet cigarette vendors into the states' regulatory
scheme for cigarette distribution will also immunize state tobacco tax
collection efforts from a host of legal challenges. For example, dor-
mant Commerce Clause challenges, such as the challenge to New
York's ban noted earlier, 95 would become more difficult to win. The
proposed legislation implicitly authorizes states to adopt New York
style bans on direct-to-consumer cigarette deliveries. States that were
dissuaded from following New York's lead for fear of being chal-
lenged under the dormant Commerce Clause may enact similar legis-
lation, under the proposed legislation. To date, only Alaska has fol-
lowed New York's lead. 196 A similar ban was proposed in at least one
other state.
197
State laws targeting Internet cigarette vendors would also enjoy
protection from legal challenges based on the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration Authorization Act.' 98 Several states require Internet ciga-
rette vendors to use only delivery services that check identification to
ensure recipients are eighteen years of age or older, the legal mini-
mum sales age in every state. 199 In October 2003, a group of New
193 S. 1177 § 2(c) (emphasis added).
194 Compare to H.R. 2824 §2, which mandates:
[e]ach person who engages in an interstate sale of cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco or in an interstate distribution of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco
shall comply with all the excise, sales, and use tax laws applicable.., in the
State and place in which the cigarettes or smokeless tobacco are delivered
as though the person were physically located in that State or place. Id.195 See discussion infra Part II.B.
196 See ALASKA STAT. § 43-50-105 (West Supp. 2003).
197 E.g., 2003 CONN. ACTS 03-271 (Spec. Sess.) (banning shipment of
cigarettes into Connecticut except when sent to licensed sellers).
198 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(c)(1), 41713(b)(4)(2000) (limiting state's ability
to regulate property transported by motor vehicles).
19 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-3-5-5 (West Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22 § 1555-C (West Supp. 2003-2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-13.11(2002); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.455 (Vernon Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-246.10 (Michie Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.155.105 (West Supp.
2004); and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-9E-4 (Michie Supp. 2003).
England-based transportation associations challenged Maine's newly
enacted delivery requirement.§200 The plaintiffs sought "a declaration
that [the delivery requirements] are preempted by federal law under
the FAAA Supremacy Clause-because those provisions purport to
regulate which 'Delivery Services' can be utilized for shipping a De-
livery Sale of Tobacco Products to a person in Maine, and what data
Delivery Services must collect from shippers of such packages."'
The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment,2 2
but similar challenges in other states are possible. The proposed fed-
eral legislation would end such lawsuits.
Lastly, the proposed legislation would prohibit common carriers
and the U.S. postal service from accepting deliveries from those ven-
dors known to ship untaxed or partially taxed cigarettes. °3 Under the
proposed legislation, states may compile lists of these violators for use
by common carriers and the U.S. postal service.204 Neither common
carriers nor the U.S. postal service would be allowed to deliver pack-
ages from listed Internet cigarette vendors unless a good faith effort is
made to ascertain that the package is free of tobacco products.20 5
The common carrier requirements of the proposed legislation are
particularly important for addressing cigarette sales from Native
American reservations and foreign Internet cigarette vendors. Nu-
merous Internet cigarette vendors are based in Europe and other for-
eign lands.206 Over one half of the Internet cigarette vendors based in
200 See Complaint, New Hampshire Motor Transport Assoc. et al. v. Rowe,
(U.S. Dist. Ct. Me. 2003) (No. 1:03cvl78DBH). The plaintiffs are also challenging
another of Maine's newly enacted responses to Internet cigarette vendors, 22 MSRA
§ 1555-D (2003), which prohibits common carriers from delivering tobacco products
into Maine from certain unlicensed tobacco vendors identified by Maine. The pre-
emption language in the FAAAS says "a State ... may not enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
route, or service" of any motor or air carrier. 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(c) (1),
41713(b)(4)(A).
201 See id.
202 See Mem. Decision of Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., New Hampshire Motor
Transport Assoc. et al. v. Rowe, (U.S. Dist. Ct. Me. 2004) (No. 1:03cv178DBH).
203 S. 1177, § 2(c); Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act, H.R. 2824,
108th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2003) (permitting states to limit delivery of products to only
those from vendors who are in compliance with the law).
204 S. 1177 § 2(c).
205 The Senate version requires warning labels on packages, which are re-
quired to state: "CIGARETTES / SMOKELESS TOBACCO: FEDERAL LAW
REQUIRES THE PAYMENT OF ALL APPLICABLE EXCISE TAXES, AND
COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LICENSING AND TAX-STAMPING
OBLIGATIONS." S. 1177, § 2 (c). Packages without this notice would be consid-
ered non deliverable for all common carriers and the United States Postal Service, if
they know or should know that the package contains tobacco. Id.
206 See JUDITH MACKAY & MICHAEL ERIKsEN, The Tobacco Atlas 60 (Paulo
the United States operate from Native American lands.2 °7 States en-
counter numerous difficulties when attempting to collect tobacco
taxes from these groups. For example, states have the legal right to
require vendors on Native American lands to collect sales and excise
taxes for cigarettes sold to non-tribal members and keep records about
each sale, but because of the tribal sovereign immunity, states are
barred from prosecuting the vendor.20 8
The common carrier requirements of the proposed legislation al-
low states to prosecute Native American-based Internet cigarette ven-
dors, albeit indirectly, while at the same time, allowing Native Ameri-
can tribes to maintain sovereign immunity.20 9 Similarly, the common
carrier provisions allow states to avoid confronting the legal and prac-
tical complexities of suing foreign internet cigarette vendors. These
benefits, along with clarification of Jenkins Act enforcement, make
the proposed federal legislation important for future tobacco control
efforts in the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
Increases in state and federal tobacco taxes should continue as an
important part of tobacco control in the Internet era. Massachusetts is
the most recent state to initiate a lawsuit under the Jenkins Act to
compel the release of customer information so that tobacco taxes may
be collected from smokers.210 The Internet cigarette vendors, not the
customer, pose the greatest hurdle in this process, according to a
Jeremy & Candida Lacey eds., 2002).
207 See Ribisl et al., supra note 5.
208 See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizens Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 507 (1991). States can go after the wholesalers that provide
cigarettes to vendors located on Native American lands. States typically allow
wholesalers to sell both untaxed and taxed packages of cigarettes to vendors based on
Native American lands. The untaxed cigarettes are for tribal members and the taxed
cigarettes are for non-tribal members. However, it is difficult to ensure the accuracy
of such estimates. The vendors may overestimate the percentage of sales to tribal
members. Suits are barred against tribes under the doctrine of sovereign immunity
absent a clear waiver by the tribe or Congress. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Neither the legislative history nor actual text of the
Jenkins Act explicitly mentions sales originating from Native American lands. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 375-78 (2000).
209 See S. 1177 § 2(c). Senate Bill 1177 exempts Native American-based
Internet cigarette vendors from direct enforcement by states to preserve the sovereign
immunity of Native American tribes. Id. § 2(d). House Resolution 2824 does not
explicitly address Native American sovereign immunity, but does define commerce
between a State and any Indian lands as "interstate commerce" for purposes of the
law. Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act, H.R. 2824, 108th Cong. § 7 (2003).
210 See Bruce Mohl, Internet Cigarette Retailers Targeted State to Sue for List
of Tax-Evading Clients, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2004, at C 1.
spokesman for the Department of Revenue in Massachusetts who
commented on the lawsuit.2 1' The spokesman stated "the numbers
suggest it is worth [Massachusetts'] time to do so [because] in the last
six months of 2003, the department sent bills to nearly 1,200 people,
and collected $162,374 in outstanding taxes from names they were
able to get through other methods. 212 Once online purchasers under-
stand that the discounts offered by Internet cigarette vendors are
largely illusory, there is a high likelihood that they will return to pur-
chasing from local vendors to avoid the hassle of paying tobacco taxes
directly to the state in a separate transaction after the purchase.213
Similar efforts should be pursued in other states. Early efforts by a
few states shows that Jenkins Act enforcement can help preserve the
public health and fiscal benefits of tobacco taxation.214 Additionally,
these efforts would be greatly aided by the common carrier provisions
and other requirements proposed in Senate Bill 1177 and House Reso-
lution 2824.215
The manner in which the Internet will affect public health policy
remains largely unknown. States traditionally retain authority to regu-
late for the protection of public health and safety.216 In the case of
tobacco control, many states have established sound policies to reduce
217tobacco use. Juxtaposed to these aggressive (and mostly success-
ful) state tobacco control policies, the federal government has estab-
lished very few policies to reduce tobacco use. In fact, some of the
policies established by federal government preempt more effective
state requirements.21 8
Nevertheless, the super-geographical nature of the Internet will
wed some aspects of state public health policy with policies estab-
lished at the federal government, whether this interaction involves
direct federal oversight or the dormant Commerce Clause or some
other legal doctrine that defines the respective spheres of authority in
our federalism. In the case of tobacco taxes, the state-federal relation-
ship thus far has been beneficial for public health. The Jenkins Act
211 See Peter Reuell, Net Cigarette Sales a Drag for the State, DAILY NEWS
TRrm. (Waltham), Feb. 18, 2004, at Al.
212 Id.
213 See discussion supra Part II.C.
214 See discussion supra Part II.B.; see also Reuell, supra, note 211.
215 See discussion supra Part III.
216 See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670.
217 See Graham Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in
the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 63-98
(1997).
218 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (finding Massa-
chusetts marketing restrictions on tobacco products preempted by the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act).
has provided states with authority to collect tobacco taxes, and states
would probably welcome passage of Senate Bill 1177 and House
Resolution 2824, at least in their present form.
